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BOOK REVIEWS
THE MORAL DECISION, RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAW, by
Edmond Cahn. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1955. Pp. ix, 342.$5.00.t
Reviewed by
DR. BRENDAN F. BROWN*
In this book, the author, who is Professor
of Philosophy of Law, Law and Society,
and Constitutional Law, at New York
University, undertakes to explore moral
right and wrong in the light of American
law, so as to provide "a new experience in
understanding and living." 1 He uses the
"moral constitution" as his criterion in the
analysis of more than twenty cases selected
from various phases of American law. He
supplements this analysis by personal opin-
ions and illustrations drawn from numer-
ous great classical books of the past. The
over-all effect is a successful refutation of
legal positivism by conclusive proof of the
essential historical and philosophical con-
nection between law and morals.
The work is part of the growing trend to
employ the case-method in teaching- and
writing about jurisprudence. The cases in
question were selected for their "prismatic"
rather than for their "demonstrative" or
"illustrative" 2 qualities, in order to enable
the reader "to discover an entire spectrum
of hidden moral interests and values" 3 in
them. They were taken from the fields of
Torts, Criminal Law, Domestic Relations,
*Professor of Law, Loyola University School of
Law, New Orleans, Louisiana.
tReprinted with permission from 44 George-
town Law Journal 542 (1956).
1 CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION, RIGHT AND
WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAW, jacket
(1955).
2 Id. at 245.
3 Id. at 52.
Equity, especially in relation to fraud and
labor unions, Tax Law, Constitutional
Law, Property, Insurance Law, and Statu-
tory Construction. Their facts have been
summarized in nontechnical language for
the benefit of the lay reader. Although Pro-
fessor Cahn, generally speaking, agrees
with the results reached in these cases, he
is not to "be charged with a credulous or
uncritical approval of the present state of
American law." 4
The author has distributed these cases
and materials under three general headings;
namely, the legal and the good, moral
guides in the American law of rights, and,
finally, moral guides in the American law
of procedure. The first two parts, dealing
with moral and legal rights, are the com-
mon province of the layman and the law-
yer, but the third part is principally for
lawyers. A discussion of morals as a legal
order, and of law as a moral order, in Part
I, is followed by a consideration in Part II
of the specific rights which are peculiar to
the various stages of a man's life. In Part
III, emphasis is placed on the necessity of
avoiding ex post facto laws, of giving notice
and hearing to a defendant, of insuring the
impartiality of judge and jury, and of
providing adequate counsel.
The book should be hailed as an impor-
tant, useful, and scholarly contribution to
the field of Philosophical Jurisprudence.
4 Id. at 245.
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It is to be commended for its insistenc,
upon the need of correlating positive law
and morals in the judicial process, and for
its successful demonstration that American
law has tended more and more to recognize
moral rights. The author has performed a
fine service for the cause of normative
jurisprudence by showing that law and
morals are not one and the same, and that
there is a distinction between the is and the
ought. He has effectively refuted those
jurists who assert that the moral measure
of law is to be found in the mores or cus-
toms of the community.
But the formula of the "moral consti-
tution" which Professor Cahn uses as his
ultimate test of right and wrong does not
sufficiently emphasize reason and neglects
the factor of will. This "moral constitu-
tion," or conscience, includes such psycho-
logical phenomena as self-dramatization,
imperfect identification, and the sense of
wrong. 5 But even this sense of wrong,
according to Professor Cahn, does not pro-
ceed entirely from the operation of reason
as a suprasensible faculty which "evalu-
ates" the moral act, for he states that
our reaction to an act of moral wrong is a
blend of reason that recognizes, of emotion
that evaluates, and of glands that pump
physical preparations for action. 6
No reference is made to the place of
the will. Since emotion pertains rather to
the physical part of man, this conception
of the human moral equipment is con-
siderably inferior to that of the traditional
school of natural law and appears at vari-
ance with the Thomistic thesis that truth
is primarily in the intellect. It is possible
of course for the emotions to reduce the
5 Id. at 16-18.
6 Id. at 18.
power of reason to comprehend the exist-
ence of moral evil in a particular situation,
and also to limit the area of free moral
choice.
Moreover, the formula of the "moral
constitution" is detached from the author-
ity of an objective natural law. How does
Professor Cahn expect to assist the reader
"to make enlightened decisions in the
moral confusion of our times," 7 when he
himself fails to accept the existence of
fixed moral principles which owe their
validity not to the appraisal of any par-
ticular individual conscience, but rather
to their intrinsic reasonableness, and be-
cause conformity to them by man is essen-
tial for the realization of ends which are
evident from his nature and the purposes
for which he was created? Is not the very
confusion of our times, which the author
laments,8 largely the consequence of re-
jecting the ideals of the objective natural
law, and allowing each individual to create
his own little natural law, as it were? With-
out an objective criterion of good and evil,
it is -difficult to understand how Professor
Cahn can go so far as to assure the reader
that the moral constitution "intimates a
promise that at times we may reach what is
called 'moral certainty'." 9
In addition to the blind spot resulting
from the adoption of a subjective concep-
tion of the moral law, Professor Cahn has
reached two moral decisions at variance
with those acceptable to scholastic jurists,
and one which is contrary to the Catholic
concept of the supernatural law. Thus he
believes that divorce, with the right of
remarriage, and the use of contraceptives
7 Id. at jacket.
8 Id. at 9.
9 Id. at 34.
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are moral, according to the "moral consti-
tution." He also rejects all interpretations
of the doctrine of original sin.
In the first place, the natural law pre-
scribes lifelong monogamy, because this is
morally necessary for the achievement of
the primary and secondary ends of mar-
riage. The primary end is the procreation
of children, caring for their physical needs,
and providing for their moral and educa-
tional training. The secondary objective is
the mutual assistance of the spouses, phy-
sical, mental and spiritual, and the allaying
of concupiscence.
Professor Cahn errs in his moral deci-
sion that American divorce law should be
changed by multiplying the number of
grounds of divorce, and by eliminating the
"guilt" theory of divorce. Particularly un-
warranted is the argument for "liberaliz-
ing" the divorce law in New York, namely,
that there is an abuse of the annulment
power of the courts by perjury. Abuse of
the judicial process is never a reason in
itself for relaxing or abolishing a law.
Professor Cahn has vaguely endeavored
to imply a parallel between the Rota, i.e.,
the highest ecclesiastical court of the Cath-
olic Church, and the New York courts, in
their use of the annulment process as a
substitute for divorce, which a spirit of
"Puritanism" in each instance would not
recognize. But certainly since marriage is
among other things a contract, there must
be a declaration of nullity ab initio if there
has been lack of consent, for marriage is
created by an act of the mutual wills of the
parties who alone can supply this act.
Hence it was necessary for the Rota in the
Vanderbilt case, cited by Professor Cahn,' 0
Old. at 100-01.
to grant "an annulment to a woman on
proof that she had been coerced by'her
imperious mother into an unwilling mar-
riage,"'1 even though "the marriage had
produced two children"12 and despite the
fact that "the suit for annulment was not
filed until 1925, some thirty years after tfle
act of coercion!" 13 The woman who had
been coerced into the marriage did not
know that her marriage was judicially in-
valid from the beginning, and hence, ac-
cording to canon law, any later assent,
short of a new consent given with knowl-
edge of the previous invalidity of the
original assent and with the intention of
making the marriage valid, could not vali-
date the marriage. 14 The decree of nullity
in the Vanderbilt case, therefore, was not
tantamount to a divorce because it did not
break the marital bond.
According to the law of New York,
annulment sometimes means a judicial dec-
laration that there never was a marriage,
but at other times it 'efers to the voiding
of a voidable marriage, which was origi-
nally valid. Manifestly, annulment in the
first sense, as where a brother and sister
have endeavored to marry, is not equiva-
lent to the breaking of the marriage bond.
Annulment in the second sense, as where
the consent to the marriage has been ob-
tained by fraud, so that the New York
courts have discretion to declare such a
voidable marriage terminated as of the
time of the declaration of nullity, deviates
from the canonical concept and involves
the breaking of the marriage bond. It is
11Id. at 101.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Can. 1133-34, 1137; BOUSCAREN AND ELLIS,
CANON LAW 515 (1946); 2 SIMPSON AND STONE,
LAW AND SOCIETY 946 (1949).
BOOK REVIEWS
perhaps juridically unfortunate that the
Net York statutes have blurred the con-
cept of annulment as understood by the
canon and natural laws. But Professor
Cahn has not offered evidence to show
that these statutes were originally intended
to provide a "popular mode of exit," 15 by
way of a substitute for divorce, or that the
judges apply these statutes for that purpose
at the present time.
The moral decision of the author to
reject the "guilt" theory of divorce and to
allow A, even though morally guilty, to
divorce B, who is not guilty, and marry
someone else, provided the fact of irrecon-
cilability was established, would seem to
invite sociological disaster. It would in-
crease the number of delinquent children
who are the aftermath of broken homes. It
would destroy the institution of marriage
which has become a fundamental postulate
of western civilization. To reject the "guilt"
theory is to deny moral responsibility, and
to adopt a behavioristic philosophy of
human conduct, which is completely for-
eign to the moral basis of the Anglo-
American common law, particularly,
equity.
In the second place, the moral decision
of the author which praises "the great and
increasing availability of contraceptives" 16
as "one of the important benefactions of
modern science and technology" 17 is con-
trary to the ideals of the objective natural
law, because it unreasonably exalts the
individual interests of the spouses at the
expense of the social interest in the pro-
creation of children. Professor Cahn has
mistakenly subordinated the primary end
15 CAHN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 101.
16 Id. at 92.
17 Ibid.
of marriage to its secondary objective. In-
deed
actually the perfection of the spouses in the
family is impossible unless they pursue the
essential ends of marriage as recognized
from the direction of the marital act toward
procreation and the resulting duties to
children. 18
Neither this perfection nor happiness can
be achieved by affirmative acts which inter-
fere with the natural effects of generative
activity to produce offspring.
In the third place, Professor Cahn
wrongly rejects all concepts of the doctrine
of original sin in his discussion of "the
cosmic meaning of decision," by stating
that it has not been demonstrated "that we
have fallen in any respect or have lost a
more important status by lapsing into
sin." 19 Acceptance of this doctrine is not
solely a conclusion of rational demonstra-
tion, but rather of grace and faith based on
divine revelation, and hence is beyond "an
objective estimate of the species we belong
1t. .... ,,20 In rejecting the doctrine, he
especially identifies it with the non-Catholic
interpretation that man is "predominantly
evil."' 2 1 Catholic theology maintains that
original sin did not render man essentially
evil, but it did weaken his will and darken
his understanding. It left in him a tendency
toward evil which will always retard his
moral progress.
Under the Catholic doctrine, it is pos-
sible to hope that "our successors can be
counted on to surpass and supersede the
moral decisions established in our time,"' 22
18 See Brown, The Natural Law, The Marriage
Bond, and Divorce, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 88
(1955).
19 CAHN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 312.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Id. at 315.
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insofar as this means that their intellects
may provide a clearer vision of the dictates
of the natural law, their wills may more
often choose the good, and their acts more
effectually implement their moral decisions.
But it will not be possible for them "to
create moral standards superior to those
their fathers evolved," 23 because man does
not "create" or "evolve" the basic truths of
the natural law. He only recognizes them,
and is under a duty to employ those means
which will best give effect to these truths.
This is not to deny, however, that moral
conclusions, reached by recourse to the
fixed ideals of the natural law, as a major
premise, will vary in accordance with the
ever changing economic, sociological, tech-
nological, scientific, and cultural facts of
the minor premise.
FOUNTAIN- OF JUSTICE, by John C. H. Wu. Sheed and Ward, New York, N. Y., 1955.
Pp. 281. $3.75.t
Reviewed by-
JOHN B. GEST*
. What is meant by law and how many
kinds of law are there? What is natural
law, what is human law, what is the essence
of law, what is the end of law? What are
the relations between the eternal law, the
natural law and positive law?
These are questions posed by Dr. John
C. H. Wu and discussed in the Prologue
of his scholar and very readable book,
Fountain of Justice - A Study in the Nat-
ural Law. In answering these questions,
Dr. Wu gives first a synopsis of his own
philosophy of law which is Christian and
Thomistic.
Dr. Wu is singularly qualified to write
in this field. The philosophy of law and
comparative law have been special studies
for him. When he was a graduate student
at Michigan Law School in 1920, being
then only twenty-one years old, he wrote
23 Id. at 314.
t Reprinted with permission, "Dr. Wu And The
Natural Law," 27 Pennsylvania Bar Association
Quarterly 338 (1956).
'Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
an article for the Michigan Law Review,
"Readings from Ancient Chinese Codes and
Other Sources of Chinese Law and Legal
Ideas." He had heard his professors speak
admiringly of Justice Holmes (then eighty)
and in 1921 he sent the Justice a copy of
the Review. Holmes was much impressed
and from this sprang the correspondence
known as the Holmes-Wu letters, and a
lasting friendship. (See John C. H. Wu,
Beyond East and West, 87 et seq.). In
1921 Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, now
of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, offered young Wu a traveling fel-
lowship in international law under the Car-
negie Endowment, which he accepted for
studies at the Universities of Paris and
Berlin. In 1923 he was a research scholar
in jurisprudence at Harvard University
under the direction of Dean Roscoe Pound.
Returning to China, he became successively,
Professor of Law, then Dean of the Com-
parative Law School, Judge of the Provi-
sional Court of Shanghai and a successful
practicing lawyer. As a member of the Leg-
